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Richard L. Velldey 
Freedom and the End of Reason: On the Moral 
Foundation of Kant's Critical Philosophy. 
Chicago: The University ofChj.cago Press 
1989. Pp. xxi + 222. 
US$29.95. ISBN 0-226-85260-1. 
In this scholarly study, Velkley argues that Kant's notion of the highest good 
(summum bonum) as the (final) end of reason is central not just to Kant's 
ethics but to his whole critical philosophy. This thesis is not new. The thesis 
is defended, for example, in Lucien Goldmann's admirable but still neglected 
Immanuel Kant (1971), Yirmiahu Yovel's Kant and the Philosophy of History 
(1980), and my own Kantian Ethics and Socialism (1988). What sets Velkley's 
study apart from these works, however, is that he examines how the notion 
of the highest good as the ultimate aim and directive force of the critical 
enterprise evolved in Kant's precritical writings in response to Rousseau and 
the 'crisis' of instrumental reason (cf. 171-2n.13). 
Velkley maintains (6) that the most important record of Kant's 'dialogue' 
with Rousseau is Remarks to the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful 
and Sublime. The book-length Remarks consists of numerous notes written 
during 1764-65. Although these notes might have been intended by Kant as 
preparatory notes for a new edition of the Observations, Velkley holds that 
they are 'better regarded as notes to Rousseau's writings' (50) .. On the basis 
of a detailed discussion of the Remarks, Velkley shows that Rousseau's 
impact on Kant goes beyond the often noted idea that the categorical impera-
tive is a moral and 'internal' version of the general will. Notably, what Kant 
learned from Rousseau is that the emancipation project of the modern age 
(the Enlightenment) was doomed to fail because it was based on a view of 
reason as an instrument for the satisfaction of the passions. Instrumental 
reason had set human beings free from the restrictions of the old religious 
order with its dogmatic teleology but also had contributed to a new human 
enslavement to egoistic insatiable passions, precluding the realization of a 
society of civic virtue. Arguing that the passions are mediated by reason and 
thus culturally influenced, Rousseau showed Kant a way out of this 'crisis' of 
instrumental reason: Kant developed the idea of reason as legislator of its 
own moral ends, and held that this form of reason can regulate and modifY 
the passions so that the pursuit of happiness will no longer give rise to social 
conflict and can be reconciled with.the pursuit of virtue. 
On Velkley's account, then, it was Rousseau who led Kant to construct a 
new kind of moral idealism in which reason projects the highest good as a 
harmony of autonomous beings 'with an appropriate satisfaction of natural 
desires' (14). The Remarks, however, only intimates the ideal of the highest 
good, and Velkley next discusses how Kant further developed this ideal 
between 1765 and 1780 in response to both Rousseau and the ancient 
Cynical, Epicurean, and Stoical accounts of the summum bonum. Velkley 
deals in most detail with the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Explained by the Dreams 
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of Metaphysics (1766), giving less attention to the Lectures on Ethics (1775-
80). He further shows that during this period Kant also was concerned with 
developing a metaphysics in accordance with the highest good. Interestingly 
enough, as early as in the Remarks and the Dreams, Kant defined metaphys-
ics ~s. 'the science of the lim.its of human reason' (113). The Dreams strikingly 
antlclpates the three Critiques in some other regards: it views the limits of 
reason as beneficial in that Kant held (as Velkley puts it) that 'insight into 
highest. realities is not necessary, and is even distracting, to a firm grasp of 
the ultlmate end of human life' (112). Also, the Dreams introduces the 
'morality of postulations' in that the belief in immortality is seen as grounded 
in the infinite task set by ethical demands (110). 
In the final chapter, Velkley turns to Kant's critical period and examines 
more commonly explored areas: the highest good as 'the ultimate end of 
theoretical inquiry' (136ff.), and the highest good as the resolution of 'cul-
ture's contradictions' (152ff.). What is puzzling (although this has its own 
merits) is that Velkley limits his discussion of the highest good as cultural 
ideal primarily to Kant's view in the Reflexionen (cf. 214n.75). 
Velkley formulates in his Preface and Introduction three major aims of 
his study. He successfully realizes his first aim of demonstrating that the 
impact of Rousseau on Kant is much more extensive than is commonly 
thought. One would wish, though, that Velkley had made his discussion more 
accessible so that it would not presuppose a thorough familiarity with both 
Kant and Rousseau. 
Velkley less successfully realizes his second aim of showing that his 
analysis of Kant's precritical works clarifies various aspects of the critical 
writings, in particular, the doctrine of the highest good. To be sure, Velkley's 
analysis has the merit of underlining that the highest good in the critical 
corpus is to be seen primarily as a cultural or social ideal because Kant began 
to develop this ideal in response to the 'crisis' of instrumental reason (cf. 153). 
However, Velkley notes but does not really analyze such problems as that 
the Kant of the critical period offered conflicting conceptions of the highest 
good and that the highest good as a social ideal does not seem to warrant the 
postulate of a future life. For a discussion ofthese problems, one must turn, 
for example, to Lewis White Beck, Yovel, and Thomas Auxter, to whose 
writings on the highest good Velkley pays surprisingly little or no attention. 
Velkley's final objective is to show that Kant's 'dialogue' with Rousseau is 
important to our contemporary understanding of human emancipation and 
reason. Although this project seems tenable and worthwhile, I find Velkley's 
own execution of it in his Epilogue too brief and suggestive to be very helpful. 
Velkley's interesting historical study should have ended with an equally 
interesting detailed contemporary conclusion. 
Harry van der Linden 
Butler University 
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